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Canada's Tactical Aviation Problem: It's Not About Helicopters

  • marketing33042
  • Sep 5
  • 2 min read
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Canada wants to replace its CH-146 Griffons with the "Next Tactical Aviation Capability Set" (nTACS). The official plan: spend the next decade studying, then field aircraft in the early 2030s, with final deliveries mid-2030s.


That's too slow. And it's framed the wrong way.


The real issue isn't what helicopters Canada buys - it's whether the CAF can build a credible tactical aviation force that survives and matters in modern warfare.



The comfortable answer: Just buy helicopters


Procurement debates always collapse into platform tribalism: Black Hawk vs AW149, Apache vs armed utility, tilt-rotor vs conventional. It feels like strategy, but it's not. It's bureaucracy with rotor blades.


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The risk: Canada spends billions, takes delivery in 2035, and discovers the fleet is obsolete on arrival.



The uncomfortable truth: the battlefield already changed


  • Ukraine proves low-level rotary ops are high-risk. Ka-52s deliver real effect but face brutal attrition from MANPADS and drones. Survivability now means stand-off missiles (e.g., SPIKE NLOS to 25 km), electronic warfare, and C-UAS integration, not thicker armor.

  • The Arctic is a harder enemy than Russia. Helicopters rarely carry full Flight Into Known Icing (FIKI) certification. Icing and whiteout conditions ground more sorties than SAMs. A force without real-time icing awareness is not a force you can count on.

  • Allies are moving faster.



What Canada should do differently


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  1. Mass now, not later: Buy a proven medium-lift fleet off the shelf (UH-60M class). Get aircraft and crews flying before 2030. Waiting until 2033+ is a luxury Canada doesn’t have.

  2. Small but sharp firepower: Stand up a modest Apache detachment or arm a subset of mediums. Enough to provide credible deterrence without creating an entirely new, unsustainable force structure.

  3. Technology as a force multiplier: Survivability must be designed in: C-UAS, degraded-visual-environment aids, open systems for EW. And in Canada, real-time icing detection (like Pegasus’ MIDAS) should be non-negotiable. It directly translates to more sorties flown and missions completed.

  4. Contract for readiness, not airframes: Don’t count aircraft bought—count aircraft flying. Force vendors to guarantee availability, with penalties for downtime. If Norway couldn’t get NH90s flying, Canada should learn the lesson.



The bet no one wants to place


Canada can keep chasing the perfect RFP, hoping to field a flawless fleet in 2035. Or it can buy credible capability now, with proven airframes, and build toward the future.


The first option is safe on paper but dangerous in reality. The second is messy but effective.

The right bet is obvious. But it takes courage to break with the system.



Bottom line

Canada has a once-in-a-generation chance to rebuild its tactical aviation force. The window is narrow, the threats are real, and the decisions will echo for decades. The CAF can’t afford to wait until 2035 to be credible.

The right fleet, hardened against drones and EW, optimized for Arctic operations, and enabled by new technologies, is how Canada stays in the fight.



Cole Rosentreter

Founder & CEO

Pegasus

 
 
 
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